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BOOK REVIEWS
The Birth of the English Common Law. By R.C. Van Caenegem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. vii, 160.

$8.50.
During the Dark Ages, those violent centuries stretching
from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Renaissance of the
twelfth century, the rule of law practically disappeared from
Western Europe. While local or regional customs often provided
standards for social behavior that were observed more or less
spontaneously, disputes that arose between individuals or between groups over the meaning or applicability of a custom or
over matters not decisively governed by custom were resolved
either by brute force or by the discretionary authority of the
leader. There was no functioning legal system capable of protecting persons from arbitrary exercises of power and of resolving
disputes through rational methods of fact-finding and through
the application of established rules. For individuals seeking justice, "finding a competent court would have been the first difficulty; proceedings were dominated by appeals to the supernatural and by a system of non-rational proof; the execution of
judicial decisions was not assured."' Rules of law were of little
consequence when lawsuits were decided by ascertaining the
judgment of God through the mechanisms of ordeals, oaths, or
battle.
Western Europe in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries witnessed, in Van Caenegem's words, a momentous modernization of society in general and the law in particular. 2 During
this formative period, when other aspects of European culture
(theology, literature, architecture) enjoyed a degree of homogeniety that has not been achieved since, English and continental
law irrevocably, and surprisingly, took their different courses.
1. R. David and J.E.C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 25-26
(1968)(Eng. Edition of R. DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTEMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (2d ed.
1966)).
2. VAN CAENEGEM at 89. The path-breaking historial account is C.H. HASKINS, THE
RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY (1927). For Van Caenegem, a "modern" legal system is primarily one that employs rational procedures and rules for resolving disputes and
for protecting private rights. In England and France modernization and centralization
went hand-in-hand as new royal institutions deprived warring feudal lords and selfgoverning local communities of much of the power they had previously enjoyed. Centralization, however, is not a necessary concomitant of modernization because, as Van Caenegem recognizes, modern legal systems developed simultaneously in the independent Flemish towns. VAN CAENEGEM at 146 n.101.
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Thus, two of the four legal "families" of the world described by
Professor David, the common law family and the Civil Law or
Romano-Germanic family, 3 originated in Western Europe at
roughly the same time but under very different circumstances.
The Civil Law arose in the great universities where scholars
revived the study of Roman Law and developed a systematic
"doctrine" based on considerations of reason and justice for the
judges to apply deductively in resolving the cases before them.
Only later in the eighteenth and nineteenth century did this doctrine take the form of a legislative code. The origin of the common
law, on the other hand, was more rooted in the history of the time;
it derived from the personal efforts of the English monarchs, especially Henry 11 (1154-1189), to establish a network of royal courts
that would bring law to their subjects and internal order to the
kingdom. The common law was not a body of principles but primarily a system of remedies afforded by royal justices throughout
the kingdom for an ever expanding category of basic wrongs.
Professor Van Caenegem of the University of Ghent in Belgium first wrote on the formative period of the English common
law in his monumental study Royal Writs in England from the
Conquest to Glanvil (Selden Society 1959). There he focused on
royal initiatives in the development of the writ system as the
principal source for the development of the common law. The
present volume derives from a series of lectures Van Caenegem
delivered in 1968 at University College, Cambridge, that state
succinctly and in more accessible form the conclusions of his
larger study. In this volume he also responds to scholarly criticism of his earlier work and adds new material of special interest
to the more general reader on the origins of the jury and on the
distinctive courses taken by English and continental law. The
result is a concise and erudite survey worthy of the important
topic selected and of interest both to lawyers and historians.
While the general reader may find the text slow going at times,
Van Caenegem nevertheless manages to convey a real sense for
the primary sources and for the often violent events of the time.
As an "intruder" to the common law from a country with a Civil
law tradition, Van Caenegem has not only mastered the English
materials but has contributed special insight.
Van Caenegem divides his book into four chapters covering
respectively The English Law Courts, The Royal Writs and Writ
3. The other two families are Socialist Law and philosophic or religious systems
(e.g., Muslim law). DAVID AND BRIERLY, supra note 1, at 14-20.
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Procedures, The Jury in the Royal Courts, and English Law and
the Continent. The approach is thus topical rather than chronological. In the first chapter he depicts the uncertain if not chaotic
conditions in England of the early twelfth century created by the
overlapping and often conflicting jurisdictions of the courts.
Courts of feudal lords existed side-by-side with the older communal courts of the local governmental units of county and
hundred. People who had been wronged either could not find an
appropriate court or, if they did, could not obtain a judgment or
execution thereon. As described by one contemporary author,
"the perversity of the situation and the flood of evils" led people
to avoid making claims because "the definite truth of the law can
seldom be found." 4
Certainly the search for truth was not aided by the irrational,
superstitious methods of proof that prevailed in both the feudal
and the communal courts. In the former, trial by battle, one of
the least fortunate innovations brought to England by the Normans at the time of the Conquest, was the predominant method
of proof, while ordeals were the most popular method of proof in
the communal courts. Trial by battle was nothing more than a
judicially sanctioned duel, often involving hired champions,
where God was supposed to insure that victory went not to the
stronger but to the righteous. Ordeals, on the other hand, took a
variety of forms and were designed to test the oath of one of the
parties. In the ordeal of the hot iron, for instance, one of the
parties (normally the accused or the defendant) swore to his innocence and then picked up a hot iron and carried it a certain
distance. His guilt or innocence depended on whether his hand
healed within a prescribed period of time.5
The absence of a modem legal system in early twelfth century England and the weaknesses of the courts that were
available were most evident in land litigation. The wrong most
commonly alleged in the land-oriented society of the time was
that the defendant had unjustly disseised the plaintiff from his
4. VAN CAENEGEM at 17 (quoting the anonymous early twelfth century author of the
Leges Henrici).
5.

T. PLUCKNETT,

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE

COMMON

LAW

114 (5th ed. 1956)

[hereinafter cited as PLUCKNETTI. In one of the most celebrated ordeals, Queen Iseult,
rightly suspected of adultery, "passed" the ordeal of the hot iron after successfully swearing that "no man born of woman has held me in his arms saving King Mark, my lord
[husband], and that poor pilgrim who only now took a fall, as you saw." Before taking
the oath, Iseult had cleverly arranged to disguise her lover Tristan as the pilgrim and to
fall into his arms after she commanded him to carry her across a stream on the way to
the ordeal. Since her oath was true, she naturally passed the ordeal. THE ROMANCE OF
TRISTAN AND ISEULT 95-96 (J. Bedier ed., H. Belloc tr. 1961 Vintage Paperback Edition).
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freehold estate. Bewildered plaintiffs who had lost their freeholds
and did not know where to get justice naturally brought their
grievances to the king, whose initial response was often to issue
an executive writ ordering the alleged wrongdoer to restore the
complainant to his freehold. In his earlier work, Royal Writs from
the Conquest to Glanvil, Van Caenegem argued that these executive writs were the precursors of the later judicial writs of novel
disseisin, mort d'ancestor, utrem, and darien presentment. These
later writs were directed to the sheriff and ordered him to summon the defendant before the royal justices who would determine
with the aid of twelve "recognitors" or jurymen whether the complainant was unjustly disseised or otherwise entitled to possession
of the freehold estate in question. This subsequent judicialization
of the writ system proved necessary because kings were often lied
to and executive writs issued in error later had to be retracted.
In Chapter II on Royal Writs and Writ Procedure, Van Caenegem reiterates in more summary form his earlier arguments
but, in responding to the critical reception his position has received in some quarters,' gives more recognition to the fact that
the decision reached in the 1160's to judicialize the process was
innovative and constituted a break with the past. While the executive writs may have been precursors of the judicial process,
something new was added by Henry II around 1166. It is surprising that Van Caenegem continues to deemphasize this break,
because the element added by Henry II was nothing less than a
modem legal system of royal justices and jurymen for resolving
land disputes.
Some of the uncertainty about the origin of the judicial writs
may now have been cleared up by Professor Sutherland in his new
book on The Assize of Novel Disseisin. Sutherland argues that
F.W. Maitland, the most distinguished of all English legal historians, was right all along when he asserted in 1896 that the writ,
in its classic form of a civil action brought at the suit of a party
to regain possession of a freehold estate, was provided by a royal
legislative enactment, now lost, in or about 1166.1
The most striking feature of the assize of novel disseisin and
its companion assizes was the role of the "recognitors" or jurymen. Any measure of effectiveness enjoyed by the older methods
of proof gradually broke down as people lost faith that God would
protect the righteous in battle or from the ordeal and strike down
6.
AND

See especially D.M.

THE GREAT CHARTER.

7.

D.

STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST

(1966).

SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL DISSEISIN

6 (1973).
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the giver of a false oath. Peter the Chanter, a Schoolman in Paris
of the late twelfth century, could only see tricks and cheating in
the ordeals. "[H]e knew a man who, before he had to undergo
the water ordeal, learnt from patient exercise how to control his
breathing so as to succeed in the trial. And as far as the ordeal of
the hot iron was concerned, it was clear that innocence was too
closely connected with calluses."' In 1215 the Fourth Laternan
Council in Rome finally accepted the arguments of the theologians that it was tempting God to demand constant miracles even
for the sake of saving innocent suspects and withdrew all ecclesiastical sanctions from the ordeals. This action precipitated a
minor crisis on the Continent necessitating the development of
new methods of proofs. The principal method of proof adopted
was the Romano-canonical procedure whereby the judge examined the witnesses (including party witnesses) in secret under
oath and on the basis of these interrogations rendered judgment.
No gap of similar magnitude appeared in England because by
1215 the jury system had already developed as an alternative
method of proof that could replace the older, now discredited,
methods.
The origin of the common law jury has provoked heated controversy between English medievalists who defend the institution's native roots and continental writers who insist that the jury
derived from the Frankish inquest procedure which was known to
the Normans on the Continent and brought with them to England
after the Conquest. Treatise writers and other more general writers have more often than not accepted the latter theory.9 Van
Caenegem advances an amalgam of the two theories and suggests
that the Frankish inquest procedure took hold in England because it coincided with certain native habits, going back to AngloSaxon time, of determining the facts by asking questions of the
neighbors. 0
Van Caenegem's thesis is reasonably persuasive but does not
explain how the Frankish inquest became the medieval English
8. VAN CAENEGEM at 69. In the water ordeal, the accused was bound and let gently
into the water so as not to make a splash. If the water received him (e.g. he sank), the
accused was saved; if the water rejected him and he floated, he was condemned.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 5, at 114 (5th ed. 1956).
9. PLUCKNETT, supra note 5, at 110 (5th ed. 1956); J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY
JUDGES 118-129 (1960) [hereinafter cited as DAWSON].
10. VAN CAENEGEM at 79. Interestingly, his concession to the English medievalists
(and to the Anglo Saxons) indicates that modernization is a relative concept and that
conditions were not totally bleak in England prior to the accession to the throne of Henry
II.
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jury. In the original inquest procedure royal or ducal officials
determined their lord's fiscal rights or other rights in land by
inquiring of the neighbors under oath. The "jurors", if they may
be called that, resembled witnesses more than modern jurymen,
and the information they supplied did not constitute a verdict
but was the evidence on which the royal officials based their
decision. There is considerable evidence that the inquest, when
transplanted to England and made widely available by the monarch to his subjects, developed similar characteristics, especially
in criminal-type cases. The neighbors on the jury did not always
agree as to what happened and sometimes expressed ignorance on
the facts in issue. The royal judges often took it upon themselves
to reconcile conflicting versions of the facts or to ascertain which
if any of the jurors derived his information first-hand rather than
from community gossip. If none of the jurors was adequately informed on the disputed facts, additional jurors could be summoned. As the role of the royal judges increased and that of the
collective or group verdict of the countryside diminished, the inquest came dangerously close in the early thirteenth century to
becoming an inquistorial method of proof. The road to that development was open in England just as it was open in France. "What
was needed was extra zeal or sustained curiosity on the part of
the English judges, inspired by a conviction that determination
of the facts on which the judgment must rest was an essential part
of the judge's task.""
Somehow the role of the neighbors on the English jury
changed in the course of the thirteenth century and they became
real jurymen returning an inscrutable, collective and unanimous
verdict which constituted the decision in the case because it controlled the actions of the judges. While this development may
have been fortunate in the long run, its short-term implications
were not necessarily so. The English legal system at this time
imposed the "fact-finding function . . . on groups of laymen,
whose ignorance was disguised by a group verdict and whose
sources of knowledge the judges refused to examine,"'" and only
later developed techniques for presenting factual information
(i.e., evidence) to juries.
Perhaps this expansion in the jury's role is related to the
adoption of the inquest procedure as part of the assize of novel
disseisin and related assizes. The recognitors summoned by the
11.

DAWSON, supra note 9, at 126.

12.

Id.
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sheriff were to answer the specific question of whether the complainant was unjustly disseised, rather than general queries on
royal rights or the presence of malefactors in the area. This narrowing of the inquiry may have resulted in more specific answers
that controlled the outcome of the case. While this explanation
is certainly conjectural, it does not appear to be more so than
others that have been proffered. Professor Dawson, for instance,
in part explains the jury's expanded role as the product of a copout by the royal judges who were in short supply anyway and
more than glad to put the decisional burden on the jury."
Strangely, Van Caenegem does not contribute to this debate in
his otherwise comprehensive chapter on the distinctive courses
taken by English and continental law.
Van Caenegem views the matter of timing as crucial to the
distinctive development of the English common law. The great
reforms of Henry II took place in the mid and late twelfth century. Thus, England had in great part already modernized its
legal system by the time that the legal learning in the universities
had developed far enough to influence the courts. While Van
Caenegem rightly ridicules those English historians who attribute
their country's precocity to the English climate or to some feature
of the national character, he himself takes refuge in the irrational
factor of chance. "I feel that the role of chance in history in
general and in the establishment of the Common Law in particular has been too striking to be passed in silence."' 4 While his
discussion on the role of chance makes for interesting historiography, I find more fruitful his analysis of the factors (be they fortuitous ones or not) that made twelfth century England a prime
candidate for early modernization. The well-established and relatively stable local institutions of Anglo-Saxon England and the
popular Anglo-Saxon reverence for the monarch provided a base
on which the strong-willed and comparatively long-lived Henrys
were able to forge a modern legal system. This fusion of the
Anglo-Saxon and the Norman produced the common law which
itself bound England together into a single country that was neither Anglo-Saxon nor Norman but English.
Edward A. Tomlinson*
13. DAWSON, supra note 9, at 128-29. Dawson is more convincing when he relates the
jury's survival and growth in England to the comparative strength of English local and
community institutions and to how those institutions were co-opted by the monarch rather
than destroyed by him.
14. VAN CAENEGEM at 107.
* A.B. 1961, Princeton University; M.A. 1962, University of Washington; LL.B.
1965, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

